Introduction
Longevity risks, i.e., unexpected improvements in life expectancies, impose a challenge on pension plans and insurance companies because small unexpected improvement in life expectancies may lead to severe solvency issues for these annuity providers. Longevity-linked securities are designed to pay out more when a selected population group lives longer than originally expected. They are attractive securities to financial markets because, on one hand, they are desirable assets for annuity providers to hedge their longevity risks, and on the other hand, investors may find these securities attractive for the benefits of diversification provided that the risk premia are set appropriately. Moreover, financial markets may provide a more efficient risk allocation than the traditional insurance markets. Although academic researchers, policy makers and practitioners have talked about it for years, longevity-linked securities are not traded in financial markets due to the pricing difficulty. This paper therefore proposes a new method to price the longevity risk premia in order to tackle the pricing obstacles of the innovative longevitylinked securities.
This paper contributes to the literature by quantifying the longevity risk premia in various longevity-linked securities (bonds, swaps, caps and floors), applying the equivalent utility pricing principle. Based on the equivalent utility pricing principle, we obtain a minimum risk premium required by the longevity insurance seller and a maximum acceptable risk premium by the longevity insurance buyer. These upper and lower bounds indicate a price range for negotiation between the sellers and the buyers. The four main advantages of our methodology are: i) the suitability for incomplete market pricing, ii) a narrow range of the risk premia, iii) the consistency with other financial market risk premia (like inflation risk premium) and iv) its flexibility in handling different payoff structures, basis risk and natural hedging possibilities.
In practice, life insurers, also pension funds, claim that their annuity businesses are losing money due to the unexpected longevity improvements over years. In the past centuries remarkable improvements in human life expectancy have been observed. The uncertainties about the further improvements of human life expectancy are referred to as the longevity risks. Oeppon and Vaupel (2002, in Science) report striking evidences that the record life expectancy has been rising nearly three months per year in the past 160 years, and the asserted ceilings on life expectancy were surpassed repeatedly in the past century. In fact, the future improvements of life expectancy are difficult to be predicted accurately.
‡ The general opinion from the experts tends to be that the trend of longevity improvements is certain, but deviations to both sides are possible. ‡ Brown and Orszag (2006) discuss the difficulties in making an accurate mortality projection.
the market development of longevity-linked securities is that multiple sellers, instead of a single seller, are required.
In this paper, the longevity risk is modeled as proposed by Lee and Carter (1992) , and estimated according to the U.K. and the Dutch mortality data. However our pricing methodology is quite general.
Other stochastic mortality models are also suitable for our pricing framework.
Recently, a few approaches to price longevity risk were proposed in the literature. Friedberg and Webb (2005) apply Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CCAPM) to estimate the longevity premium. Their result based on CAPM leads to a risk premium of 75 basis points, with confidence interval ranging from -75 to 230 basis points, due to inaccuracy in estimating the beta. Their result based on CCAPM is merely two basis points, due to the low variation in consumption data. The discrepancy between the author claimed two basis points and the market claimed 20 basis points is similar to the equity premium puzzle using the CCAPM approach. Young (2005, 2006) proposed a Sharpe ratio approach, which is based on mean and volatility of payments instead of returns. The methodology used in this paper is the equivalent utility pricing principle. Our approach is suitable for pricing in incomplete market. It provides a narrow price range for negotiation. The resulting risk premia are consistent with other financial market risk premia (like inflation risk premium). Our pricing framework is flexible in handling different payoff structures, basis risk and natural hedging possibilities.
Apart from securitization, there are three other possibilities of managing longevity risk, namely hedging, reserving and risk sharing. ‡ ‡ The longevity risk could be partly hedged using natural hedging, for example between life annuity and term insurance. This paper illustrates the effect of the natural hedging on longevity risk premia. The impact of natural hedging is potentially significant.
The organization of this paper is the following: Section 2 introduces stochastic mortality models in order to quantify longevity risks. Section 3 describes longevity-linked securities, and incompletemarket pricing principles. In Section 4 we quantify the (seller's minimum) longevity risk premium for EIB/BNP type of longevity bonds using the equivalent utility pricing principle. Section 5 extends the longevity risk premia calculation to other longevity linked securities, including swaps, deferred bonds, floors and caps. Section 6 introduces the possibility of natural hedging into our pricing framework.
Section 7 considers buyer's maximum premium, together with the presence of basis risk. Section 8 concludes. ‡ ‡ See also Brown and Orszag (2006) , Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2006) .
Stochastic Mortality Models and Longevity-Linked Securities
This section first presents a stochastic mortality model to quantify longevity risks, and then describes the longevity-linked securities in more details.
Stochastic Mortality Models
The literature of stochastic mortality trend starts from Lee and Carter (1992) . § § According to Deaton and Paxson (2004) , the Lee-Carter model has become the `leading statistical model of mortality in the demographic literature'. Therefore, the numerical results presented in this paper are based on Lee and Carter (1992) model.
Other stochastic mortality models may also fit well in our pricing framework. Dahl (2004) and Schrager (2006) advocate the affine stochastic mortality models to capture the birth cohort mortality dynamics over one's life cycle instead of the time series of an age group over time. We leave the affine stochastic mortality approach as a future work for robustness analysis. Lee and Carter (1992) model the time series behavior of log central death rate of an age group by using a single latent factor. The latent factor drives the mortality rates of all age cohorts. Formally, the log mortality rate of the x-year-old,
, is determined by a common latent factor, t γ , with an agespecific sensitivity parameter, x β , and an age-specific level parameter, x α , Assuming that the force of mortality is constant during a year 
Longevity-Linked Securities
Given the potential size of the longevity trend uncertainty, financial markets proposed longevity- 1) The designed 25-year horizon is perhaps too short for an effective hedge, since longevity risk in the near future (<10 years) is small.
2) The up-front capital requirement is large, especially since a major part of the capital is taken by the ineffective hedge coupons in the near future.
3) The coupons are indexed to 65-year-old males, but annuity providers worry about longevity risk of younger cohorts and females.
4) There is large uncertainty about what the right price is that should be charged. 5) Hedge failure or basis risks are large, due to a number of reasons: the reference population is different from that of an annuity provider; the survivor index is not timely available, etc.
6) The payments are nominal, whereas most pension schemes aim at inflation-linked real payments. ‡ ‡ ‡ Money's worth of annuity is the expected discounted value of future payments, without risk loadings. 
Longevity Risk Pricing Principles, a Review
This section reviews the recent literatures on incomplete market pricing, and motivates our choice of the methodology. Finally, we specify the utility preference needed for the equivalent utility pricing principle.
CAPM-and CCAPM-based approach. Friedberg and Webb (2005) 
The authors claim that the beta on pseudo-EIB/BNP bond is 0.15 with 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.15, 0.46] . Therefore, if market risk premium is 5 percent, the longevity risk premium on this bond is 75 basis points, with confidence interval of [-75, 230 ] basis points. Given the wide confidence interval, the authors suggest that CCAPM as a better alternative.
Following the CCAPM, the longevity risk premium is determined by the relationship between the expected return on the asset and the marginal utility of consumption.
( ) , '
The paper shows that the correlation between consumption growth and survivor bond returns is -0.1958 and is significant. However, since the standard deviation of mortality bond returns is small, as a result, the covariance between survivor bond returns and consumption growth is extremely small at -0.0015 percent. Applying the CCAPM, the risk premium is only two basis points when the coefficient of risk aversion equals 10. This result is far below the 20 bp risk premium marketed in the EIB/BNP bonds.
Sharpe ratio approach. Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) suggest that the absolute value of the Sharpe ratio on any unhedgeable portfolio should be bounded, so that too `good deals' are ruled out. Young (2005, 2006) propose a so-called instantaneous Sharpe ratio to determine the mortality risk premia. Using the analogy to the Sharpe ratio in the financial market, which is the ratio of the expected excess return and the return volatility
Sharpe ratio in the insurance context could be defined as the excess payoff above the expected payment, divided by the standard deviation of the risky payment,
authors argue that the longevity risk loading L will be set so that the Sharpe Ratio is consistent with other asset classes in the economy. For example, if the Sharpe ratio for large cap equities is roughly 0.25, then the Sharpe ratio of the insurance policy should also be bounded within a similar magnitude. § § § Equivalent utility based approach. The pricing method proposed in this paper is based on the equivalent utility pricing principle. The equivalent utility based approach is a popular pricing methodology for incomplete market setting. The related literature includes Svensson and Werner (1993) , Young and Zariphopoulou (2002) , Young (2004) , Musela and Zariphopoulou (2004) , De Jong (2007) , Chen, Pelsser and Vellekoop (2007) and other references listed in the bibliography. As pointed out by Svensson and Werner (1993) , the shadow value of a non-traded or non-hedgeable asset (the price of longevity risks in this case) can be interpreted as an additional amount of wealth added to the investor's budget so that the investor is indifferent between holding a non-hedgeable asset and hedgeable asset.
Furthermore, the shadow value is investor-specific, depending on the investor's preference. In the context of longevity-linked securities, equivalent utility pricing principle reveals the minimum compensation required by the seller and the maximum price acceptable to the buyer. Therefore, this paper shows the range of possible prices for the longevity-linked securities before the market opens up.
De Jong (2007) applies the principle of equivalent utility in pricing wage-linked securities, in an incomplete market setting. In the context of defined benefit pension fund liability valuation, the main source of unhedgeable risk is the real wage growth. The pension fund is modeled as a potential buyer of the wage-linked bonds. Hence the equivalent utility pricing gives the maximum risk premium that the pension fund is willing to pay in order to obtain the insurance against the wage rate fluctuations. The paper shows the risk premium is determined by the additional wealth needed to be invested in the § § § The authors are still working on the estimation of the Sharpe ratio using annuity rate quotes. The results are not available yet.
financial market in order to provide the participants the same level of utility as a fully wage-indexed pension.
Assuming exponential utility function, Musela and Zariphopoulou (2004) , as well as Henderson (2002), show a simple analytical formula for pricing an non-traded claim. As we shall see, the pricing formula of the longevity-linked claims derived in this paper is consistent with the result found by above mentioned authors. The next sub-section illustrates the idea of equivalence pricing principle using a very simple model. The complete model is treated in Section 4.
An Application
Before going into the pricing, let us fix some notations. In the context of annuities, let N denote the initial size of the x-year-old cohort at time zero, and K is the agreed amount of annuity payment per annual. In the context of longevity bonds with varying coupons, NK denotes the notional coupon, and
is the actual amount of coupon due in year t. In this paper, K is normalized to 1. Finally, the number of survivors in this cohort in year t is given by . We assume that the longevity risk is the only risk factor in this simple illustration. Now we illustrate the equivalent pricing principle by pricing a zero coupon longevity bond, with maturity of t years. Such zero coupon bond is effectively a large group of single premium endowment contracts which pays an agreed amount (normalized to K = 1) at a future time t to the survivors of the current x-year-old cohort. The longevity risk can be described as the deviation from the expected survival 
The resulting risk loading is given in expression (7), which is also known as the exponential risk premium (Kaas, et al. (2001) 
The total premium can be seen as the `best estimate' plus the (macro) risk premium which equals the logarithm of the moment generating function of risk t S at argument α divided by the CARA coefficient α . Notice that the risk loading is not affected by the initial wealth, 0 W , for the CARA preference.
In a special case, if t S is normally distributed, then the minimum loading [ [ ]
Numerical results:
The risk loading 
The risk premia for CARA and CRRA utility specifications are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below. The key features of the results are: 1) The required risk premium is negative, meaning that the bond yield is lower than the risk free rate, so that the bond price is higher than the risk free bond. Thus, the insurer (i.e., the survivor bond issuer) is compensated for bearing longevity risks.
2) The additional discount rate p R (in absolute value) increases as the size of the pool increases.
3) The more risk averse the insurer is, the higher compensation is required. 4) Approximately, the longer the maturity, the higher compensation is required.
Preference Assumption
The results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal some unsatisfied properties of CARA and CRRA preferences. For a CARA investor, he has the same worry about one additional euro loss no matter how rich or poor he is. For a CRRA investor, he cares much less when he is rich. In our view, both preferences are too restrictive to characterize the risk preference of financial institutions. The CARA utility might overestimate the longevity risk premium, whereas the CRRA utility might underestimate the risk premium. Therefore, we modify the CARA utility, to make the risk aversion depend on the initial capital 
It is important to be clear about whose preference that (10) captures. Sections 3 to 5 focus on seller's minimum required risk premium. Therefore the utility function (10) represents the preference of the shareholders of the seller. In the context of the EIB/BNP longevity bond, it is the preference of the shareholders of EIB/BNP. Section 6 discusses the buyer's maximum risk premium. Hence the utility function (10) represents the preference of the buyer, e.g., a pension fund. **** Wachter and Jogo (2007) (and their references) provide arguments and evidences for a wealth-varying risk aversion.
Pricing of a Coupon-Based Longevity Bond
This section derives the minimum required longevity risk premium of a coupon based longevity bond from the seller's point of view. The longevity bond is linked to a large pool of population. Therefore mortality risk (also called micro longevity risk) is fully diversified. The setup of the model is the following. The shareholder of a financial company (like EIB/BNP) derives her utility from dividends and final wealth. We consider two alternative situations. In the first situation, the company does not insure longevity risk, hence is not exposed to longevity risk. In the second situation, the company issues a longevity bond and hence bears longevity risk. Furthermore, we assume that the macro longevity risk is independent from the financial risks. The methodology used in this section combines the martingale approach with the equivalent utility pricing principle.
Setup Problem 1 without longevity risk
Assume a complete financial market, with constant risk free rate, r. The shareholder (or manager)
of the company derives her utility from dividends and final wealth at the end of the horizon, T. The perperiod utility is described as (10), and δ is the subjective discount rate of the shareholders. 
where t M is the pricing kernel for the complete financial market. In our model, t M is given by
Problem 2 with longevity risk
In the same financial market, the company issues coupon-based longevity bond, in which the annual coupon is indexed to the 1939-born cohort survivor index. This cohort retires in 2004 at age 65. 
Applying the equivalent utility pricing argument, we determine the minimum risk compensation π such that the company is indifferent from bearing the longevity risk and without the longevity risk. That is, the indirect utility must be equal under these two situations:
Results
The We can also express the risk loading π in terms of risk premium, p R , which can be seen as an additional discount rate above the risk free rate to adjust for the longevity risk. As explained in Section 3.1, the risk premium is negative, meaning that the bond yield is lower than the risk free rate, so that the bond price is higher than the risk free bond. Thus, the insurer (i.e., the survivor bond issuer) is compensated for bearing longevity risks. 
Implications
The implication that we can get from the above results is that longevity risk premium depends on the financial position of the insurer. Large equity financial institutions may require a lower risk premium.
Put differently, smaller issues (smaller K) may require lower risk premium. In order to avoid too high risk premia, it might be helpful to have many large institutions all issuing moderate amounts of longevity bonds, linked to the same survivor index.
Pricing of Other Longevity-Linked Securities
In this section, we look at other types of longevity-linked securities, including swaps, deferred starting bonds, floors and caps. Since the market is incomplete, we will show that different payoff structures may lead to different risk premia. risk premium of a longevity swap is the same as in a longevity bond with the same maturity and the same amount of notional issues (Table 4 ). The main advantages of swap lie in a much lower up-front capital requirement and lower credit risk, as compared with a long maturity longevity bond.
Vanilla Longevity Swaps

Deferred Longevity Bonds
A deferred longevity bond starts paying the longevity-linked coupons s years after the issuance, till the bond maturity in year T. An advantage of a deferred longevity bond is that it skips the ineffective hedge coupons in the first few years, and hence requires much less up-front capital than an immediate coupon paying bond. Following the same pricing principle as in Section 4, the risk loading of a deferred longevity bond is given by 1 ln
where α is the shorthand notation for ( ) Tables 5 and 6 show the relative risk loadings and the risk premia of several deferred longevity bonds. The following results assume that all deferred longevity bonds mature in 35 years, but the first coupon payments could start 5, 10, 15 or 20 years after the issuance. Notice the first row in the tables is an immediate starting bond for comparison. The initial capital is much smaller than the immediate starting bond, but the relative risk loading is much larger. As a consequence, the required risk premia are also larger than the immediate starting bond. # year best w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100 defer estim. b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 0 13 ,1  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  1%  1%  2%  5  8,6  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  1%  1%  2%  10  5,2  0%  0%  1%  4%  0%  1%  2%  4%  0%  1%  2%  4%  15  2,7  0%  1%  2%  6%  0%  1%  2%  6%  0%  2%  3%  6%   20  1,2  0%  1%  2%  8%  0%  1%  3%  8%  0%  2% 4% 8% 
Longevity Floors and Longevity Caps
For the case of a longevity floor, the payoff structure is 
1 ln
where Table 7 compares the longevity risk premium p R (in basis points) of longevity bonds, longevity floors and longevity caps respectively. We observe three things from Table 7 . First, the risk premium of the longevity floor is larger (in absolute terms) than that of the longevity bond. This is because the payoff of the longevity bond is symmetric, whereas the payoff of a longevity floor is highly asymmetric.
Therefore a higher risk premium is required for bearing losses only. Second, the risk premium of the long position in this longevity caps is positive, which means that the insurer pays for the call option. The more risk averse the insurer is, the less willingness to pay (read: compensate) the counterpart, for receiving the uncertain profit. Thirdly, as the initial wealth decreases (hence the relative risk aversion increases), the value of the floor increases. 
The Effect of Natural Hedging
It is known that term insurance policies provide a natural hedge for the immediate annuities (see, e.g., Cox and Lin (2004) ). The term insurance pays out a certain amount of death benefit if the policy holder dies before the contract expires. Since longevity shocks affect all age cohorts in the same direction, the unexpected increase in annuity payments to the retirees can be partially offset by the unexpected reduction of death benefit payments linked to the younger cohorts. The availability of natural hedging clearly affects the risk premium of the longevity bond issuance company. This section examines the magnitude of this effect on the pricing of longevity bonds.
Suppose that the longevity bond issuance company bears the risks from both the term insurance 
Following a similar argument as in Section 4.2, equalizing However, the hedging is not perfect. Table 8 shows the minimum required risk premia, p R , which is clearly reduced when natural hedging is available. The risk premia are more than halved compared with the case without natural hedging. 
7. The Demand Side Pricing and Basis Risk
The Demand Side Pricing
The demand side pricing considers the maximum price BUY π that the buyers (e.g., annuity providers) are willing to pay for the longevity bond or other securities in order to be fully insured against the longevity risk. From buyer's point of view, BUY π can be derived in the same framework as in Section 4. Assume an annuity provider sold annuities to a cohort retiring in 2004 at age 65. The shareholder of this annuity provider derives her utility from dividends and final wealth. We still consider two situations.
In the first scenario, the annuity provider bought the ideal EIB/BNP survivor bonds at price BUY π so that the longevity risk from her annuity contracts is completely insured. In the second scenario, the annuity provider bears the longevity risk herself.
Problem 3 without longevity risk
Assume a complete financial market, with constant risk free rate, r. The annuity provider derives her utility from dividends and final wealth at the end of the horizon. ( ) ( )
Problem 4 with longevity risk
In the same financial market, this annuity provider did not buy any longevity bond, and hence bears the longevity risk herself. The company derives her utility from dividends and the residual claim
E S S − ) from the longevity risk. The longevity risk is not hedgeable from the financial market. The company maximizes her utility by optimizing asset allocation and dividend decisions.
[ ] ( )
Applying the equivalent utility pricing argument, we want to find the minimum risk 
The maximum premium that a buyer of the longevity bond is willing to pay has the same form as the minimum premium that the bond issuance company requires. It is common to assume that the longevity bond buyer is more risk averse than the bond issuance company, or the financial position of the buyer is weaker than the seller.
The buyer's maximum price is also influenced by whether or not natural hedging is possible. The availability of natural hedging could reduce the buyer's price significantly. Furthermore, the presence of basis risk and the risk sharing possibility will also affect the buyer's maximum price.
Basis Risk
An ideal longevity bond which provides a perfect longevity hedge should be linked to the annuitant population of the annuity provider. However, quite often this is not the case. There is a discrepancy between the reference population that the bond is linked to and the annuitant population of the bond buyer. Although the survival probabilities of the two populations might be (highly) correlated, the longevity bond buyer still exposes to the remaining unhedgeable part, the so-called basis risk. 
Assume that the Dutch pension fund has the same preference and the same level of equity as the longevity bond issuance company, and also assume that the Dutch pension fund has no natural hedging possibility. If without basis risk, that is, if there were a longevity bond linked to the Dutch population, then we get the following maximum acceptable longevity risk premium p R as given in Table 9 . ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ However, since there is no such longevity bond linked to the Dutch population directly, but linked to the British population, the hedging will not be perfect. The basis risk between the two populations will reduce the risk premium. Indeed, the demand side risk premium in Table 10 (with basis risk) is lower than that of in Table 9 (without basis risk). Table 9 .
Equity w0 = 10000 w0 = 1000 w0 = 100 maturity b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 b=1 b=1/4 b=1/8 b=0 
Conclusion
Longevity risk imposes serious solvency issues on pension plans and insurance companies.
Longevity-linked securities are desirable instruments for buyers and sellers, but are not traded yet in financial markets because of the pricing difficulty. To tackle the pricing problem, we propose a new pricing method, which is more accurate, flexible and consistent with other financial risk premia and suitable for incomplete market pricing. Our methodology is based on the equivalent utility pricing principle. The obtained narrow range of the longevity risk premia captures the seller's minimum price and the buyer's maximum price. We apply the method in pricing various longevity-linked securities (bonds, swaps, caps and floors) linked to the United Kingdom and the Dutch mortality data. We show that the size of the risk premium depends on the payoff structure of the security due to the market incompleteness.
Given a plausible range of risk aversion, financial position and other assumptions, we show that the resulting risk premia are consistent with the limited market observation and consistent with other financial risk premia (e.g., inflation risk premium). We also show that the impact of natural hedging is potentially significant. The results provide design implications for longevity-linked securities and longevity risk management. 
Since about 95 percent of the variance in the long-term forecasts is generated by the innovation of the latent factor t γ , as reported by Lee and Carter (1992) , one can simplify the forecast formula of , 
The survival probability of the x-year-old over one year, assuming that the force of mortality is constant during the year 
The survival probability of the x-year-old over τ years is given by 
A.1. Estimation Procedure of LC92 Model
Let Y denote the matrix of log mortality rates, with each row for each age group ln x μ for N historical observations. We first construct a demeaned matrix of log mortalities,
, where x α is the mean value of ln x μ , and ι is a row vector of ones. Then, as proposed by Lee and Carter (1992) , we can use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), X=USV', to estimate the latent factor t γ and the agespecific sensitivity x β . Since the first singular value is significantly larger than other singular values, one can use one factor to approximate the log of force of mortality, as proposed by Lee and Carter (1992) . 
